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PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE 1947 ACT AND
HOW REFORM COULD BE EFFECTUATED
Dr. John C. Fortier*
Thank you to Fordham Law School, all the students and others who have
been part of this conference, including John Rogan, Reb Brownell, and, of
course, Dean Feerick, who not only is the former dean of Fordham Law
School, but really is the dean of presidential succession studies. All of us
have learned a lot from him and benefited from both his wisdom and practical
experience.
I want to say my fellow panelists here may be the greatest collection of
people who think about presidential succession since James Madison dined
alone.1 It may be a bad joke, but it also puts me on record as to where I stand:
against including legislators in the line of succession, as James Madison was
many years ago.2 I know that most of the participants are probably on that
side of the issue, but I very much appreciate Professor Tillman joining us and
making some arguments in the other direction on the issue of legislative
succession.3 I’m going to come back to those arguments a little bit later with
some positive things to say about them.
The title of my remarks is supposed to be Proposals to Reform the 1947
Act and How Reform Could be Effectuated. I feel like I’ve been set up a little
bit because it is a very difficult thing to effect change in this area. We, the
Continuity of Government Commission, including a number of people here
on this panel and conference, were also part of an earlier version of the
Commission that issued a set of recommendations to Congress in the
post-9/11 era. We’re back doing some work now on continuity of Congress,
which may be even a harder nut to crack.
I think the simplest point is that we haven’t seen a lot of taking up of our
recommendations. On some of the big issues, there has been a lot of interest,
lots of talk, but it is hard to get things done. I don’t want my remarks to be
* Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Executive Director, Continuity of
Government Commission. These remarks were delivered as part of the program entitled The
Presidential Succession Act at 75: Praise It or Bury It?, which was held on April 6, 2022,
and hosted by the Fordham University School of Law. This transcript has been edited,
primarily to conform with the Fordham Law Review’s publication requirements, and
represents the speaker’s individual views alone.
1. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 61–62 (1965).
2. See id.
3. See generally Seth Barrett Tillman, A Defense of the Legislative “Officer” Succession
Provisions, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 23 (2022).
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just a set of complaints about how hard it is, but maybe an elevated set of
complaints, which look at some of the reasons why this has been hard to get
done. Maybe we can think about some successes we had and some of the
reactions that we saw in Congress to some of the things we were proposing.
Again, I will not be too negative about prospects for legal change because
Dean Feerick has been part of an effort to get a constitutional amendment
enacted. If we can’t get some legal changes done, or some legislative
changes, maybe we’re aiming too low here.
First, I think we should note how fortunate we’ve been that we have not
had a death in the presidency in almost sixty years. It’s the longest period of
time we’ve had in our republic without a president dying in office. If you
think about the period from when William Henry Harrison died in 1841, up
to Kennedy’s death in 1963, there was not a period of more than twenty-two
years where we didn’t have the death of a president plus many deaths of vice
presidents. In some ways, we’re living in an extraordinary time where the
death of a president is thankfully not on the minds of people.
I don’t want to say that every set of reforms has been driven by presidential
deaths, but many have. Certainly, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947,4
our focus today, was driven by the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the
succession of Harry Truman. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment5 had that
dynamic with Kennedy’s death, and the experience with Eisenhower’s
illnesses in the 1950s in the background, with many people remembering it
very, very recently. Today, we have very few people who were adults and
remembered very well the death of President Kennedy in 1963. I think that
makes it difficult.
In thinking about reforms to the 1947 Act, there are many particulars that
call out for reform. The biggest ones really have to do with mass-casualty
situations. Maybe I’m thinking that because our Commission has been
working on continuity-of-government issues; I’m thinking about these more
extreme issues relating to mass attacks. Many things with the line of
succession go fairly well if it’s one president at a time: a death of a president,
followed by perhaps later on another death of a president, in a sort of orderly
way. But when we think about all the problems of multiple deaths, multiple
deaths at a certain time, with the fog of war, changing circumstances, and the
various institutions, that’s where we really get into some of the difficulties.
This is where I’ll say something about Professor Tillman’s point. I don’t
think that it is just party continuity that is on people’s minds when thinking
about changing the Presidential Succession Act to take out congressional
leaders. It is there, certainly. For the average person the idea of party
continuity in presidential succession resonates. Why would we want a
Democratic president out of the blue if we elected a Republican? More than
just the party-succession idea, I do think that the prospect of mass vacancies
and confusion around succession points to the problem of having members
of Congress in the line of succession.
4. 3 U.S.C. § 19.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
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To Professor Tillman’s credit, his proposal—which I’m not sure I endorse
completely—putting the legislative people at the very end of whatever line
of succession, is worth considering.6 I think we have all sorts of ways of
improving the line of succession, but legislative leaders as an ultimate
backstop is an argument that is reasonable in many ways, but also, would
remove some difficulties, most of which arise because the current
arrangement of legislative leaders in the line of succession can cause
confusion. The difficulties with legislators in the line of succession come
from the fact that there are situations, like many disability scenarios, when
it’s very complicated to think about the Speaker or the president pro tempore
coming over to take the White House in the middle of a crisis. We think also
of the so-called bumping provision, where one could imagine scenarios
where there are presidents coming and going at various times. Having
legislators in the line of succession in these scenarios adds confusion rather
than clarity to the line of succession. But having legislators at the end of the
line of succession, as an ultimate backstop if everyone in the line had been
killed, would not cause the kind of confusion that our current law could
invite.
One other side note on the issue of legislative leaders in the line of
succession and how the current setup might be problematic, which is in the
case of the impeachment and removal of a president. And here I would like
to reference Dr. Fins’s account of the Carl Albert speakership with some
additional information.7
There was Ted Sorensen’s role in this, which was part of a very partisan
effort. There was a group of liberal Democrats, a smaller group, certainly
not the majority of the caucus. One of the leaders was Representative Bella
Abzug. At this point, we had the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in place, so there
was a mechanism for Nixon to appoint a new vice president with the
confirmation of both houses. What Abzug and others were arguing for was
for the House to leave the vice presidency vacant, impeach and remove
Nixon, and therefore ensure that Democratic Speaker Albert would become
president. There is some reporting on this and I probably don’t know the full
account, but Speaker Albert was approached by Abzug and she said, “[g]et
off your goddamned ass, and we can take this presidency.”8
There was an effort going on, and ultimately with Tip O’Neill’s help and
Albert himself, this pressure was resisted.9 I guess one other part of the story
is that I actually, before 9/11 and before working on these issues, had run a
project on transition memos, or presidential transitions. There is a whole
history of transition memos, a famous set by the political scientist Richard
6. See Tillman, supra note 3, at 27.
7. See Joseph J. Fins, Carl Albert, Bipartisanship, and Presidential Succession: Lessons
from Watergate, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 59, 60–63 (2022).
8. Ted Gup, Speaker Albert Was Ready to Be President, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 1982),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/28/speaker-albert-was-ready-tobe-president/84ebaa61-9cf1-4817-836e-a993e7e0e980/ [https://perma.cc/J9EA-MFUT].
9. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 47 (2d ed. 1992).
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Neustadt, who wrote several for John F. Kennedy and some others for some
losing candidates.10 There were some other people like Donald Rumsfeld
and others who wrote them, but this is how we ran across the memos.
I actually remember them being longer than the nineteen pages,11 so I’m
going to have to go back to my files, but they were quite extensive. They
were thinking through from a PR standpoint of how you would present the
Carl Albert presidency to the nation; a person from another party taking over
in the aftermath of impeaching and removing a president.12 There was a real
battle with Carl Albert and Tip O’Neil on the one side, who wanted to be
more nonpartisan and ensure that the successor to Nixon would be of the
same party, and others like Abzug who were pushing for the Democratic
Speaker to take the presidency.13
Back to my point about what we should be thinking about in terms of why
reform is so difficult. We’ve experienced the death of individual presidents.
Very fortunately, we’ve not had a mass-death scenario, with multiple figures
in the line of succession killed in an attack. We’ve not had this terrible,
terrible thing happen, so we have a hard time even conceiving of it. I think
that’s one of the difficulties of members of Congress and others thinking
about dealing with this issue. They see it as an interesting Tom Clancy
scenario, but it’s not real to them in a certain way, and once you start thinking
about some of the trade-offs of this solution or that solution, they might want
to talk about it, but to get them to really act in that way is difficult.
Again, I’m not going to spend my whole time complaining. Although, I
do think that we have also seen some very pedestrian concerns about reform,
people worried about offending the president pro tempore, wanting to take
them out of the line of succession. My wife worked for a president pro
tempore for quite a while in the Senate—not the favorite subject to bring up
with the boss. You don’t want to say, “well, why don’t we take you out of
the line of succession?” The Speaker even more so. Why would a House
member really advocate that the Speaker or the Speaker of the other party be
taken out?
One other specific matter we had proposed is the problem of an attack on
Inauguration Day. We proposed to have some of the Cabinet members of the
incoming administration nominated by the outgoing president shortly before
or maybe even a few days before the inauguration, to sit in place as a backstop
so that a new administration would have someone in place. The opposition
10. See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard E. Neustadt, Professor of Gov’t, Columbia
Univ., to John F. Kennedy, President-Elect (Oct. 30, 1960), https://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/JFKNSF/322/JFKNSF-322-019 [https://perma.cc/82M8-ZJG3?type=image].
11. See Memorandum from Theodore C. Sorenson, to Carl Albert, Speaker, House of
Reps. (Nov. 8, 1973), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&
context=twentyfifth_amendment_watergate_era [https://perma.cc/H7YN-RBMX].
12. See generally id.
13. See Mike Cathey, During Nixon Impeachment, Speaker Albert Considers Resignation
in Support of Bipartisanship, MCALESTER NEWS-CAPITAL (Feb. 1, 2020),
https://www.mcalesternews.com/news/local_news/cathey-during-nixon-impeachmentspeaker-albert-considered-resignation-in-support-of-bipartisanship/article_33a1aa13-0292542a-8707-83802bb6c6d8.html [https://perma.cc/T2A2-PLDP].

2022]

PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE 1947 ACT

51

we got often was that nobody wants to have their commission signed by the
previous president, especially if it’s a president of the other party. Not the
highest concern, but one that you certainly hear.
Again, I think that there are some reasons why this type of reform is
difficult. I won’t go through all of the reforms that our Continuity of
Government Commission proposed in the post-9/11 period. We are
reconstituted and doing some new work now: dealing with the issue of
legislators in the line of succession and the question of not even the order but
the quality of the line of succession—we propose having only the top Cabinet
members be in that line. But at the same time, we are dealing with another
issue, which is having members of the line of succession outside of
Washington—we propose new offices be created so that there would be more
protection against a more comprehensive attack that would affect many,
many people.
We did propose a special election. That tends to get some uncomfortable
laughs from members of Congress. I think there’s real benefit, especially
when one thinks about the possibility of a successor far down the line
becoming president. Because of an attack or because of a problematic
resolution of an election, perhaps a person is going to be put in the White
House for four years and that person might not be seen as legitimate by the
American people. So you have to go back to the people with a special
election if the acting president is someone far down the line of succession.
Obviously, we run more complicated elections than we used to, but it still
is worth thinking about that. That’s the backstop for all the problems that we
have, and all the imperfections that we might have in the line of succession.
We might be able to just live with an imperfect successor for a while, until
we have an election when the people could speak again and fill that term for
maybe another three, three-and-a-half years. Then, finally, the inauguration
scenario, which I think is a difficult one.
I do think one other strategy is to think about some very discrete reforms.
I think the inauguration is one. And I will give Norm Ornstein credit for
engaging in talks with some outgoing administrations to think about things
that they might do, even nonlegislatively, in terms of what Secretary Johnson
mentioned: having a Cabinet secretary or someone step away, or at least
thinking about what the transition between administrations is going to look
like with regard to this.14
Also, scenario planning: A.B. Culvahouse, who will be with us on a later
panel and is co-chair of our government continuity Commission, stresses
rightly that there’s a lot of planning that goes on in the Executive Branch at
the White House, and all through the Executive Branch, but not so much in
Congress.15 Getting into that planning and having the people think a little bit
more about some of the difficulties of the Succession Act is worthwhile.
Many of them are aware of that and they’re not policymakers per se. I still
14. See Jeh C. Johnson, Keynote Address, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 5, 6–7 (2022).
15. See Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., A White House Counsel’s Perspective on Presidential
Health and the Line of Succession, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 79, 79–81 (2022).
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think that a worthwhile strategy is going at some of these questions more
directly and legislatively at the conference.
Finally, I would like to say that we always learn things at these
conferences, and again, we have John Feerick to thank for not only his work
on these issues, but for convening us at various times over the years. Many
of us have seen each other before, some of us are new, but you always learn
things. So the good work of these conferences is a way to push forward the
scholarly debate on presidential succession, but might also spur us on to find
new ways to get some of these reforms into place.

